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Abstract 
A growing wave of co-location programmes promises to boost growth for young firms. Despite great 
public and policy interest we have little idea whether such programmes are effective. This paper 
categorises accelerators and incubators within a larger family of ‘co-location' interventions. We then 
develop a single framework to theorise workspace-level impacts. We summarise available evaluation 
evidence and sketch implications for regional economic policy. We find clear evidence programmes 
are effective overall. But we know little about how effects operate – or who benefits. Providers and 
policymakers should experiment further to establish optimal designs. 
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1/ Introduction 
Innovation is a driver of development: ideas advance the technological frontier, feeding 
through to productivity growth (Romer, 1986). Similarly, entrepreneurs are ‘carriers of new 
ideas’ who play an important role (Schumpeter, 1962; Audretsch, 2007), as part of larger 
sectoral, regional and national institutions and systems (Freeman, 1991; Cooke, 2002; 
Malerba, 2002). However, both innovation and entrepreneurship require learning from others, 
involve experimentation and carry a high risk of failure (Kerr et al., 2014). 
Theory suggests geographical concentration is one way to facilitate creativity, the exchange 
of ideas or reduce entrepreneurial risk. Consistent with this, a large empirical literature 
documents the positive effects of geographic concentration – at neighbourhood, city and 
regional scale – on innovation and entrepreneurship.    
Most attention has focused on clustering and cluster policies as ways to understand and 
exploit geographic concentration. Clustering is ‘associated with pervasive market failures’ 
(Duranton, 2011) (p.4) so government intervention can, in principle, improve on market 
outcomes. However, in practice the case for, and effectiveness of, cluster policies has been 
strongly contested (Martin and Sunley, 2003; Duranton, 2011). Duranton (2011) highlights 
three major difficulties. First, clustering is an outcome of many decisions, as well as a driver, 
so is not easily manipulated by policy. Second, the complexity of cluster market failures 
makes policy hard to target effectively. Relatedly, complexity tends to lead to policy 
tradeoffs – a specific example of the issues now raised around inclusive growth.1  
In this paper we suggest existing debates have focussed too much on clustering as a feature of 
regional economies and a target for policy, and too little on specific co-location policies. That 
is, on the effect of policies that enable firms to locate on the same premises (e.g. in co-
working spaces) or on sites within walkable distance (e.g. in science parks). This paper plugs 
this gap by pulling together diverse theoretical strands on  co-location and by reviewing the 
empirical evidence on the effects of specific interventions. We also argue that co-location 
policy tools can potentially contribute to cluster-level outcomes, and thus to broader regional 
economic development.  
1 See Lee (2018) for further discussion. 
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In practice, governments and the private sector use various co-location tools to promote 
innovation or entrepreneurship, but these are, surprisingly, poorly understood. Two 
developments make this a timely moment to focus on their impact.  
First, a recent wave of studies uses causal inference to understand how co-location of 
scientific researchers shapes innovation outcomes (Catalini, 2017; Helmers, 2017).  
Previously, little was known about the effectiveness of science parks and traditional business 
incubators despite these being well-established interventions (Phan et al., 2005; Siegel et al., 
2003). 
Second, new variants on business incubation have emerged for start-ups and early stage 
businesses (Schmidt and Brinks, 2017). With roots in the technology industry, modern 
incubators and accelerators are found in many large cities. They are marketed as business 
support programmes, based on co-working, that help start-ups and early stage firms to grow. 
Incubators typically act as ‘clubs’ – co-working space with mentoring and networking 
services added on, and firms renting rooms or desks on flexible contracts. Accelerators are 
more akin to ‘bootcamps’ – intensive networking and mentoring opportunities offered to 
competitively selected firms, often over shorter time periods.  
The UK has the largest number of such spaces outside the US (Telefonica and O2, 2014). 
These business models are spreading into other sectors such as retail, travel, hospitality, 
advertising, fashion and visual arts, as well as in high-tech manufacturing via makerspaces 
and fablabs (Fassio and Grilli, 2016).2  
Accelerators potentially generate substantial gains for tenants and – by speeding up 
entrepreneurship and innovation processes – they may also benefit the wider economy. 
Proponents claim they help young firms innovate, strengthen business models, then attract 
external investment and increase sales. For example, Birdsall et al (2013) argue that firms 
graduating from the best US accelerators have 10-15% higher survival rates after five years, 
and have earlier and higher rates of acquisition than comparable companies. If such results 
2 Most recently, corporate-led programmes have emerged that link a single large firm to a cohort of startup/SME 
participants. These apply some accelerator concepts to existing models of open innovation in large firms and 
MNEs (McCann and Iammarino 2013) although typically with less emphasis on co-location. 
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generalise, this suggests a role for economic policy to intervene – to encourage, incentivise, 
provide, or even regulate.  
Around half the UK’s co-working interventions already have public funding behind them – 
but hardly any test impacts (Bone et al., 2017).  There is a clear need to think through, and 
test, if and how programme effects might operate. Doing this requires addressing several key 
questions. 
First, the selectivity of many interventions means that chosen start-ups might have ‘done 
well’ without the programme. If selection or signalling drive programme outcomes, the real 
effect could be minimal. In this case, it makes more sense to see programmes as ways for real 
estate actors to better utilise commercial space (especially in high-demand cities). In policy 
terms, they become a planning and property market issue, rather than an economic 
development one. Second, and relatedly, we need to consider how different types of 
provision might affect outcomes. The role of universities in many programmes may hold 
lessons for HEIs as anchor institutions (Valero and Van Reenen, 2016). Third, we need to 
consider who benefits. Incubators and accelerators may be useful tools in inclusive growth 
strategies, as a response to rising rents and costs, and as a way of helping (for example) 
female and minority ethnic entrepreneurs around structural barriers they may face in ‘regular’ 
economic space (Lyons and Zhang, 2017). Conversely, such groups may find it harder to 
access such programmes given male-domination in the tech sector. Finally, understanding 
any programme-level impacts may feed into area-level economic outcomes.  
It is thus crucial to develop frameworks for delineating the new wave of colocation tools; 
assessing possible effects and impact channels, including distributional impacts; identifying 
lessons, and knowledge and policy gaps that need filling.   
This paper is a first contribution to these challenges. It draws on three OECD-wide 
systematic reviews covering co-location interventions for firms (incubators, accelerators) and 
for researchers (co-location in a building, conference, science park or major science facilities). 
We also draw on interviews with policymakers and programme operators. Where appropriate, 
we relate this material to theory and broader empirical evidence from urban economics, 
economic geography, innovation, management and economic sociology fields. 
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The paper makes three contributions. First, we site incubators and accelerators in a larger 
family of ‘co-location' interventions. Second, we develop a framework linking workspace-
level impacts to several different literatures. Third, we combine the evaluation evidence, such 
as it exists, and sketch out implications for local development. As far as we are aware, it is 
the first study of its kind on these new programmes. 
2/ Methodology 
We draw on three linked systematic reviews of evaluation evidence, a survey of the wider 
literature, and a series of provider interviews.  
Systematic reviews are a method for structured literature reviews, using iterated search 
parameters, multiple searches, and transparent rules for selecting and ranking evidence 
(Gough et al., 2013). Our three reviews focus on quantitative evaluations of incubators; 
accelerators; and researcher co-location tools from the OECD, in English. The reviews 
include any study providing before-and-after or cross-sectional evidence, controlling for 
differences between supported and unsupported areas or firms. They also include more robust 
studies using a control group or  experimental or quasi-experimental methods (What Works 
Centre for Local Economic Growth, 2016). Using these criteria, the reviews find fourteen 
studies looking at effects of accelerators and incubators. Three of these do not distinguish 
between accelerators and incubators. Eight further studies evaluate researcher co-location 
tools. These policies include supporting science parks, provision of key scientific 
infrastructure, building-level co-location, and ‘temporary co-location’ (such as attending 
events).3  
We organise findings by outcome, and vote counts, and evidence quality, then interpret 
results. In the tradition of ‘realist synthesis’ (Pawson, 2006), we also use material from a 
survey of relevant qualitative and descriptive studies to help interpret our findings.   
3 We focus on evaluations of policies that encourage co-location. This is distinct from a larger set of studies that 
describe researcher location patterns or compare outcomes between more and less densely concentrated groups. 
The studies we focus on provide stronger evidence of causal impact of specific ‘interventions’, arguably more 
relevant for policymakers in designing specific interventions. 
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Finally, we conducted semi-structured interviews [n = 8] with incubator and accelerator 
providers, as well as industry and academic experts, using snowball sampling.  
3/ Definitions, business models and the wider context 
We view accelerators and incubators as business support programmes providing packages of 
support to young co-located firms. We distinguish accelerators from incubators based on the 
definition in Hathaway (2016), summarised in Table 1. 
Accelerators use competitive entry and intensive support, typically targeting start-ups for 3-6 
months. Accelerators may be non-profit, although they are more often operated by venture 
capitalists who take equity stakes in participating companies. Participants are usually 
provided with an on-site work place, plus business skills training, intensive mentoring and 
networking activity.  The application process is typically highly competitive. For instance, 
YCombinator, a top US accelerator, has two application seasons per year, accepting just two 
or three per cent of the several thousand firms applying.  
Table 1. Key terms. 
Accelerators Incubators 
Duration 3 to 6 months 1 to 5 years 
Cohorts Yes No 
Business model Investment; can also be non 
profit 
Rent; non profit 
Selection Competitive; cyclical Non-competitive 
Venture stage Early Early or late 
Education Seminars Ad hoc; human resources or 
legal support 
Mentorship Intense; by self and others Minimal; tactical 
Venture location On-site On-site 
Source: Adapted from Hathaway (2016). 
Incubators typically use non-competitive entry and comparatively ‘light-touch’ support, 
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typically targeting start-ups aged 1-5 years. Incubators are usually non-profit or run as 
managed workspaces, where firms have rolling contracts and pay rent, staying for between 
one and five years. Incubators provide workspace and ad hoc training relevant to the business 
(e.g. in accounting). Mentorship is also provided but is often minimal and tactical (i.e. advice 
as needed), as opposed to the more intense, scheduled, and consistent mentorship provided by 
accelerators.  
As with many new phenomena, an inordinate amount of time is spent on attempting to 
delineate business models. We find it most useful to think of a simple overlapping 
categorization according to the density of tenants and the intensity of support, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.   
For smaller, denser spaces, incubators and accelerators are distinctive in their intensity of 
support. Co-working spaces share some similarities with incubators – in terms of physical 
set-up, some input-sharing, target clients and (non-competitive) entry. However, there is little 
or no active management, community curation, or provision of additional services. Intensity 
of support also helps differentiates incubators and accelerators from serviced offices aimed at 
established businesses: fully-fitted-out office buildings offering modular space (typically per 
room or per floor) where the emphasis is on sharing physical inputs.   
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Figure 1. A typology of co-location interventions. 
Of the less dense spaces, science parks facilitate the sharing of physical inputs both high end 
(university libraries, labs and researchers) and more mundane ( meeting rooms, conference 
facilities and cafeterias). These also play a real estate role: helping firms flexibly adjust their 
commercial space usage, without undertaking costly re-location. Many parks also offer 
advice and may help manage companies. Industrial estates have important roles to play in 
providing space for urban manufacturing, logistics and distribution, and for artists workshops 
(Wainwright, 2017). Here the emphasis is on input-sharing and flexible commercial space 
with little, if any, provision of support. We do not consider this category any further in what 
follows. 
4/ Drivers 
Incubators, accelerators and related spaces are a feature of the UK and other countries’ 
business landscape. As of April 2017, the UK had 771 incubators, accelerators, co-working 
and related spaces (Bone et al., 2017). Of these 182 were accelerators, 213 were incubators 
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and 50 were co-working spaces. London had 171, more than the next 10 cities combined.4 
London exemplifies the rapid spread of such spaces: in 2014, over half the city’s provision 
had been established in the last three years. WeWork, perhaps the best-known provider, had 
zero London presence at the start of 2017, but 29 offices by November that year.5 As of 
November 2017, user costs in London varied widely, from £35/month for a TechHub desk at 
Campus London to £450/month for a desk at WeWork Tower Bridge.6 
Several structural factors, documented elsewhere, explain rising demand for co-working 
space. The shift in the structure of production away from manufacturing towards services 
increased the proportion of employment in activities for which the co-working model is 
relevant. Several forces reinforce this compositional effect. For example, the shift to smaller, 
more networked firms increases the number of firms benefiting from sharing physical inputs. 
Space-sharing may also be beneficial if multinational or multi-site firms employ a small 
number of employees in each location. Shifts in employment patterns - rising self-
employment, including sole traders / freelancers – also increased the number of individuals 
benefiting from sharing physical inputs. More broadly, high and rising urban rents are 
increasing the benefits of shared space, to both reduce costs and allow for more flexible 
adjustment as firms grow or shrink. 
Why the increased demand for accelerators or incubators, relative to more ‘traditional’ co-
working or serviced offices? Prosaically, the low price for (some) such spaces, versus 
serviced offices, may be part of the attraction. The high visibility of such spaces, and the 
large claims made for them, may also increase demand. A deeper reason may be sociological: 
as self-employment has risen, so entrepreneurial lifestyles have become more fashionable, 
driving up demand for spaces embodying that lifestyle. We return to these ideas in Section 5.  
Some of these factors may be more cyclical than structural. As with any fashion, the 
desirability of entrepreneurial lifestyles could change quickly and unexpectedly. Growing 
self-employment is not always a choice, if workers use this as a strategy to deal with lack of 
labour market opportunity, precarity, or to counter discrimination.  
4 Birmingham (22), Edinburgh (14), Manchester (13), Oxford (12), Belfast and Cambridge (10) Leeds, 
Newcastle, Bristol, Sheffield (9). 
5 http://www.seed-db.com/accelerators, accessed 28 March 2017; https://www.wework.com/l/london, accessed 
22 November 2017. 
6 https://www.wework.com/l/london, https://london.techhub.com/, accessed 22 November 2017. 
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On the supply side long-term shifts from manufacturing to services have meant a move back 
to urban production.7 This facilitates the sharing of fixed costs, including commercial space 
and other physical inputs (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Duranton and Kerr, 2015). Changes in 
ICTs, particularly the emergence of cloud, mobile and pervasive broadband, have also 
reduced the costs of servicing the shifting client base using co-working spaces.  
Post-industrial cities also have competing demands for space, especially residential versus 
commercial (Hamnett and Whitelegg, 2007). It is notable that co-working provision has 
grown most rapidly in cities with big local tech scenes and expensive housing. In London, for 
example, residential land is worth 3.2 times more than industrial (Ferm and Jones, 2017).  
Real-estate business models that raise the effective density of a given building are thus likely 
to become more popular. Many types of co-working can be offered in a single building; co-
working functions can also be combined with operations such as cafes, restaurants and retail. 
These higher-density uses also drive up landlord yields.   
Public policies also influence these dynamics. In the UK, for example, changes to planning 
policy and local taxation had substantive impacts. Policymakers have provided subsidised 
workspace for small firms since the 1960s, and many appeared in the 1980s and 1990s in 
British cities. At this point, around 2/3 were directly managed by the public sector (Ferm, 
2014). Since then, there has been a shift away from direct provision, towards ‘affordable’ 
workspace delivered through planning obligations. Ferm (2014; 2016) suggests these policies 
have pushed developers to focus on established, high-value tenants, leading to a shortage of 
space for newer, younger businesses. Around the same time, industrial zoning was relaxed to 
allow for more mixed-use developments, including live-work spaces (Pratt, 2009). This also 
permitted gradual shifts towards residential use (Ferm and Jones, 2017; Ferm and Jones, 
2016; Cheshire et al., 2014). In 2016, further national policy changes made it easier to 
convert office and commercial spaces to residential.8   
Overall, the these policy changes and housing market pressures in major cities reduced the 
supply of affordable, flexible space for SMEs and startups. In turn, this has driven up demand 
7 The emergence of digitised manufacturing, or ‘Industry 4.0’ (Schwab 2017; Brettel 2014), and related trends 
such as customisation / bespoke assembly may also lead to rising demand for urban manufacturing spaces.    
8 http://lichfields.uk/blog/2016/march/14/office-to-residential-permitted-development-right-made-permanent/, 
accessed 15 May 2018. 
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for cheap, high density, flexible space provision, such as co-working based business models. 
A further factor, especially in cities, is the 2017 revaluation of business property taxes, which 
in many cases have substantively increased leaseholder costs, pushing up demand for higher-
density as a way of cushioning these cost changes. 
5/ Frameworks 
Impact-testing co-location policies is not straightforward. This is partly because interventions 
work through several channels. It is also because the current literatures on co-working and 
researcher co-location are dominated by small-n descriptive comparisons and individual case 
studies (Schmidt and Banks (2017), Bound and Miller (2011), Dee et al (2011) and Phan et al 
(2005) provide reviews). While this literature makes important contributions. a more 
structural framework is also needed. This section presents a first attempt.    
5.1 / Micro-agglomeration 
One way of thinking about co-location tools is as ‘cities in miniature’. Drawing on urban 
economics, this suggests co-working spaces generate agglomeration economies within a 
given building. Following Duranton and Puga (2004) they offer combinations of ‘sharing’, 
‘matching’ and ‘learning’ economies that drive down costs, and increase innovation and 
productivity. Sharing effects arise from pooled equipment, facilities, etc. Matching effects 
from networking or peer-to-peer linkages, which help identify partners. Learning effects are 
knowledge spillovers and may arise from peer-to-peer interactions, mentoring or networking. 
Programmes might also generate diseconomies of agglomeration, such as poaching of ideas 
in environments where secrecy may be hard to maintain.   
Real world knowledge spillovers exhibit substantial distance decay, especially for 
‘knowledge-intensive’ services (Jaffe et al., 1993; Fleming et al., 2007; Kerr and Kominers, 
2015). In professional service industries such as advertising, spillovers may disappear within 
250m (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). Similarly, case studies suggest that tech and creative 
industries are often found in small, dense clusters (Martins, 2015; Nathan and Vandore, 2014; 
Hutton, 2008; Indergaard, 2004). Until recently, however, studies testing for agglomeration 
effects at the scale of rooms, buildings or campuses have been almost non-existent.    
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As in cities, the micro-foundations of a programme will depend on the sector mix and 
business models (norms and untraded interdependencies are the city-level equivalent, as per 
(Storper, 1997)). Participant surveys commonly suggest that matching and learning 
opportunities are most helpful – specifically, mentoring, networking and peer feedback (Bone 
and Burnett, 2018; Seet et al., 2018; Merkel, 2015; Chan and Lau, 2005). Signs and 
magnitudes are harder to predict a priori. For example, accelerators offer more structured and 
intensive support, but in substantially smaller cohorts than incubators. Specialised 
programmes could leverage Marshallian knowledge-sharing; cross-industry programmes 
could exploit Jacobs-style spillovers.  
Co-location programmes must rely on the benefits of close physical proximity over and 
above everyday urban interactions. This raises the question of whether programme 
effectiveness is affected by the context. Large, dense urban locations may offer 
complementary agglomeration economies (say, networks of expertise or specialized support 
industries) but also imply greater competition.  
5.2 / Proximity / distance 
Urban economics focuses on physical proximity but has traditionally said less about other 
relationships. Boschma and others (Boschma, 2005; Torre and Rallet, 2005; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2009) see geographic co-location as one of several ‘proximities’ shaping outcomes. 
Interactions may also depend on social closeness (e.g. through friendship), organisational (e.g. 
working in the same firm), cognitive (e.g. the same subject background), or institutional 
proximity (e.g. common norms).  
Boschma argues proximities can be complements or substitutes and may not be beneficial - 
‘too much proximity’ can be detrimental, for example if it leads to groupthink. In contrast, 
Menzel (2015) and Ibert and Müller (2015) see co-location as a way to bridge multiple 
dimensions of ‘relational distance’, where physical closeness strengthens actor linkages over 
time.  
These perspectives imply that co-location programme providers may need to pay careful 
attention to the ways in which participants interact. Providers often seek to develop a strong 
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cohort identity to stimulate peer interactions and develop communities of practice (see 
below). Co-location allows providers to bridge social and network distance (Menzel, ibid).  
But single industry or highly selective programmes might be less effective if they draw from 
a cognitively narrow set of participants (Page, 2007).  
To date, empirical studies of proximities typically focused on researchers, especially 
inventors and academics (Balland et al (2015) provide an overview). These studies suggest 
other forms of closeness may partially substitute for physical closeness, but also that social 
and spatial proximities can be complements. As in the economics literature, however, few, if 
any, studies apply these frameworks to co-working spaces and other co-location interventions.  
5.3 / De-risking entrepreneurship 
A third view comes from the management literature. This sees entrepreneurship as a 
Schumpeterian process of  ‘experimentation’ (Howell, 2017; Kerr et al., 2014) or ‘noisy 
learning’ (Lerner and Malmendier, 2013; Aghion et al., 1991). Entrepreneurs face many 
uncertainties and risks. Interventions that de-risk entrepreneurial activity increase the chances 
of success.  One way to do this is to provide information and contacts which would otherwise 
be costly to obtain, or whose importance might not be understood ex ante by inexperienced 
agents. In this view, programmes such as accelerators speed up what would otherwise be a 
process of trial and error, helping participants identify challenges and fix them. If so, co-
location effectiveness may be less about physical proximity and more about other aspects of 
programme design. This view emphasises the importance of linking programme participants 
to external expertise, via mentoring and networking; and encouraging individual learning and 
reflection.  
An important implication of this perspective is that programmes may help individual 
entrepreneurs realise a given idea is not viable. If ‘fixing bad ideas’ involves disbanding or 
reconfiguring firms, programmes have an ambiguous effect on survival, even if surviving 
firms perform better.   
5.4 / Economic communities 
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A fourth view, based in economic sociology, sees incubators and accelerators as socio-
economic communities, providing spaces to develop new ideas and practices, and individual 
professional identities (Schmidt and Brinks, 2017). This perspective provides insight into 
how ‘micro-agglomeration’ might work in practice, and sheds light on provider and 
participant motivations. ‘Entrepreneur’ is a partly public identity (Novick, 2017). In this view, 
co-working spaces function as shared spaces to develop ‘an ideal entrepreneurial self’, as 
well as to learn useful practices from peers, mentors, providers and others (Gill and Larson, 
2014). Different business models emphasise different aspects of communities of practice 
(Schmidt and Brinks, 2017). For example, many co-working spaces and incubators are 
positioned in terms of shared values or working conditions – providers see themselves as 
‘mothers’, ‘hosts’ or ‘social gardeners’ creating contexts where any participant can succeed 
(Merkel, 2015; Peluffo, 2013). In contrast, accelerators use more competitive language of 
‘cohorts’ and ‘teams’ and emphasise selective entry and individual achievement over 
collective success (Bound and Miller, 2011). These studies also highlight the range of 
participant motivations – some are profit-maximisers, some are more 'lifestyle businesses' – 
and how this can shape programme choice and levels of participation.   
5.5 / Testing for impact 
This framework raises important questions for policymakers and providers. First, selective 
programmes may pick the most able firms – most likely to succeed anyway. We thus need 
robust evaluation designs that control for selectivity. Second, many programmes curate 
cohorts, or select on ‘potential’, increasing the complexity of selection issues. Cohort 
selection may emphasise group fit (or diversity) over individual characteristics. Choosing on 
‘potential to benefit’ may imply negative selection by excluding experienced businesses. This 
means it is crucial for policymakers to understand programme-level objectives and selection 
decisions in detail.  
Third, participation in prestigious programmes may have a strong signalling effect distinct 
from programme content. To the extent participation raises profile, the initial selection 
decision improves outcomes. Comparing across more and less well-known programmes may 
help estimate prestige effects. Fourth, we need to understand the importance of physical co-
location, versus other programme components. This is particularly important for accelerators, 
given co-location requirements vary substantially – some require participants to be on-site; 
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others resident in same city; others deliver face to face but have no residence requirements. 
This also carries implications for incubators and co-working spaces, which involve long-term 
physical proximity. For policymakers, greater understanding will help determine support for 
co-location approaches versus conventional business support tools.  
6/ Findings 
6.1 / Provider attitudes and behaviour 
Interviews with incubator and accelerator providers illustrate how participants are chosen and 
confirm the business model differences discussed earlier. Selection decisions rarely involve 
choosing ‘the best’ firms on some objective function; rather, providers typically select across 
a range of characteristics, including competence, experience, potential and ‘fit’ (to 
programme and other applicants). In many cases scoring is only a decision guide and selector 
discretion may lead to lower-scoring firms being selected.  
These behaviours reflect the reality that many applicants are young firms, so there is little 
evidence on which to judge ‘performance’. Some programmes that select on ‘potential’ 
choose younger, less experienced firms over more experienced, better-financed businesses. 
This implies evaluation may need to look at distance travelled, as well as raw effects.  
6.2 / Overall outcomes 
The available evidence on overall outcomes is fairly clear-cut. One key finding is that 
accelerators and incubators seem to increase participating firm employment. There is more 
evidence for accelerators than incubators: three studies find accelerators have a positive 
effect. Two further studies also report positive effects, but they pool both accelerators and 
incubators. 
Five studies consider the impact of accelerators on subsequent external funding (e.g. from 
angel investors or venture capital). Four find positive effects, while one finds no effect. One 
study, looking at two prominent private sector accelerators, finds length of time spent in-
programme is negatively associated with funding. We found no studies looking at incubators 
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and external finance. 
Five studies consider the impact of accelerators on urvival: findings are positive in one case, 
mixed in one (positive for women and minorities), zero in one and negative in the other two. 
Again, there is more evidence for accelerators than incubators: only one study looks at 
survival effects of incubators, focusing on five German incubators, finding a negative effect 
for three and no effect for  two. At face value, this suggests programmes may hasten firm 
demise: an alternative – more plausible – explanation is that they help participants to quickly 
gauge the quality of their ideas (e.g. via investor / peer feedback) and encourage those with 
weak propositions to quit early. Provider interviews support this interpretation. 
6.3 / Programme design 
It is harder to draw clear conclusions for programme design: few studies robustly test the 
effects of design choices. For example, length of time spent in an incubator is, at best, weakly 
associated with improved outcomes. One study finds positive effects on revenues, no effect 
on survival and negative effects on the likelihood of graduating and getting funded. A second 
also finds negative effects on graduating but a positive effect on survival – i.e. the longer 
firms stay in an incubator, the more likely they are to stay in business. Finally, a third study 
reports a negative effect on survival and no effect on sales or employment. For accelerators, 
there is no evidence on programme length either way. 
For incubators, there is some evidence university involvement improves outcomes; perhaps 
not surprisingly, institutional affiliation and professional staff support seem more useful than 
individual academics. Four studies evaluate the impact of academic roles on companies in 
incubators. Two compare university-affiliated and non-affiliated incubators, with one finding 
university links have no effect on revenue or employment, but a positive effect on survival, 
and another finding a positive effect on both revenue and employment. A third study finds 
academic involvement has no effect on revenue – but that using university research increases 
the likelihood of obtaining venture capital, and the amount of funding. The fourth finds 
academic involvement may increase the likelihood of survival but may also have a negative 
impact on graduation from the incubator. For accelerators, we again found no evidence either 
way (probably because universities are less likely to be involved). 
17 
There is some evidence suggesting that the wider context in which an incubator or accelerator 
is located influences success. Two accelerator studies find accelerated firms located in 
competitive areas (i.e. more dense entrepreneurial networks) are more likely to increase 
employment and gain funding. One incubator study finds that locating in competitive areas 
has no impact on revenue or employment but decreases the likelihood of survival. This 
handful of studies suggest that dense, competitive (i.e. urban) environments can magnify 
success, but also decrease the survival of less capable firms. An additional study finds 
programme design interacts with the wider context – in particular, competitive environments 
might make networking and training programmes more effective, and specialisation (i.e. 
housing one type of firm) less effective. 
There is some evidence from two studies on which firms benefit most. One study finds firms 
headed by females or members of a minority benefit more from accelerator programmes, 
while another finds the same for incubator programmes, particularly in competitive areas.  
There is even less evidence on other design issues. Only one study considers sectoral mix. 
There are no clear differences in outcomes when comparing public and private sector-run 
programmes.9 Finally, we found no studies directly comparing the two approaches, so we 
know little on the value added of accelerator vs. incubators. 
6.4 Co-locating researchers 
The evidence on researcher co-location turns up some related findings (although results may 
not directly transfer). Overall, the results emphasise the importance of close co-location (in 
the same building or room); they also suggest spillovers are greatest between researchers in 
related fields, something the co-working literature hasn’t looked at in detail.    
First, close co-location – within university campuses or specific buildings – can have a 
positive effect on the probability of research collaboration and on  research quality. Two 
studies explore this. One looks at research office layout finding ‘walkability’ between 
researchers makes collaboration more likely. A more robust study finds that researchers in 
9 For funding, one US study finds that for private sector-run programmes, quality matters – “top” accelerators 
had positive effects while others did not. 
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laboratories becoming randomly co-located were more likely to collaborate, to research 
similar topics and to cite the same research. Separation of previously collaborating labs did 
not lower the future probability of collaboration, but did lower the quality of research, with 
researchers exploring divergent topics and citing different research. This suggests distance 
increases search costs partly determining research partnerships, but that collaborations are 
persistent. Similar patterns exist at larger scales, in line with the wider agglomeration 
literature. Co-location in science parks is associated with higher firm-level patenting but 
spillover effects may die away rapidly with distance. One of two studies suggests positive 
spillovers within science parks operate over small scales, disappearing for firms located more 
than 240 metres apart.  
The second main result is that spillovers may exist between researchers in different academic 
fields or commercial sectors, but the greatest positive effects of co-location occur for 
researchers and firms undertaking similar activities. The evidence supporting this finding is 
quite diverse, and more research is required to be fully confident of this.  
The two science park studies also find positive effects on patenting both within and across 
industries for firms in the park. Another study, which focuses on academic activity around 
the UK’s Diamond Light Source Synchrotron, finds the strongest positive effects on research 
output directly using Diamond, although weaker effects are also found for related research.  
One study finds researchers who work near each other are more likely to collaborate. It 
exploits a natural experiment whereby researchers were randomly allocated offices.  
Laboratories in the same tower or corridor were more likely to collaborate and co-author than 
those that were not. Similarly, two studies looking at temporary researcher colocation at 
conferences find bigger collaboration effects on researchers in similar fields. Attending the 
same conferences has a significant impact on future collaboration – especially if in a similar 
field. The ‘temporary co-location’ effect is bigger where researchers are junior , at least one 
is female and for non-presenters. The stronger of the two studies (an RCT) suggests having 
previously collaborated increases the ‘event effect’ – but the other study says the opposite. 
We have no clear evidence whether prior collaborations are likely to lead to future 
collaborations. However, studies on research lab breakup – discussed above – suggest prior 
collaboration patterns matter a lot. 
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7/ Conclusions 
A large body of evidence links physical proximity to innovation and entrepreneurship. Co-
location interventions aim to use close proximity to encourage creativity and ideas exchange, 
or to de-risk entrepreneurial activity. They are potentially important policy tools.  We suggest 
that co-working spaces, incubators and accelerators can be conceived of in four ways: as 
cities in miniature; as tools for bridging or structuring a range of relational distances or 
proximities; as ways to structure and de-risk entrepreneurial learning; or as economic 
communities or communities of practice.  
Our OECD-wide evidence reviews generate three main conclusions. First, there is fairly clear 
evidence incubators and accelerators work overall - for survival, employment growth and 
receiving external finance.   
Second, we have much less clarity about how programmes achieve results. There is 
suggestive evidence accelerators work better in rich urban milieux, that university 
involvement can help, and that female/BAME-headed businesses may benefit even when the 
average firm does not. Evidence from academic collaboration suggests  close physical co-
location (permanent and temporary) is helpful, as is same-field or closely related activity. But 
it is not clear if these findings transfer from researchers to entrepreneurs. 
Third, this raises several design questions for policymakers and programme providers. 
Researchers should work with practitioners to test the role of the public versus the private 
sector; sector mix versus sector specialism; impacts on different social or economic 
entrepreneurship groups; selection and signalling effects versus in-programme content; and 
the relative effectiveness of co-working, incubators, accelerators and 'conventional' business 
support without co-location.  
We also think that understanding the proximity micro-foundations can help us better 
understand more complex urban-level production milieux, and thus inform economic 
development policies. For example, the evaluation evidence suggests accelerator programmes 
are complementary to wider agglomeration forces, specifically the cross-industry matching 
and learning processes typically found in larger cities (Jacobs, 1969). In theory, accelerator 
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provision could help strengthen a cluster by improving productivity advantages of cluster 
location. However, it is unclear what the effect size would be, or what would comprise 
critical mass - how many spaces are needed, and how many firms 'treated'? Which sectors 
would most benefit from expansion in provision, or would effects be visible cross-industry? 
A further question is why, so far, we do not appear to see such linkages for incubator 
programmes.  
We also know clusters are characterised by positive and negative feedback loops (Nathan and 
Overman, 2013). Productivity effects grow with cluster size, as the set of knowledge 
spillovers gets larger and richer; at the same time, growing clusters become progressively 
more crowded and expensive, often displacing smaller or newer firms. Co-working-based 
interventions can - in theory - simultaneously increase cluster productivity for a given size 
(by enabling innovation and entrepreneurship) and flatten the cost curve (by more densely co-
locating firms in physical space). What might be the effect size of such provision, at what 
scale, and how might such interventions shape cluster lifecycle trajectories (Boschma and 
Fornahl, 2011; Martin and Sunley, 2011)?  
We look forward to future research tackling these issues. 
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